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TEXTS CITED 
38 American Jurisprudence, Negligence - Section 9L 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UAH 
<=H_\l~l )?\ ROBERTS, 
Plnintif f and Appellant, 
vs. 
TIL\CK\VORK CONSTRUCTION 
CCIMPANY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 
10862 
An action by plaintiff for personal injuries sus-
tained while she was operating an automobile which 
collided with a railroad track installed by defend-
ant at the Tooele Army Depot. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The jury returned a special verdict finding, 
inter alia, that plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence. The trial court entered judgment on 
the verdict in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff 
moved for a new trial which was denied. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirrnance of the J·ud 
f th t · 1 gmenr o e ria court entered on the jury verdict. , 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
. Except for. the statements relative to the iclen-
tl ty of the parties and the time of the accident, dr-
f endant cannot accept plaintiff's statement of facb 
due to the argumentative context in which thev a
1
.,. 
recited. · 
Defendant contends that the uncontrovertecl 
facts of this case are as follows : 
Plaintiff was traveling west on a roadway in 
the Tooele Army Depot which crossed over two seb 
of railroad tracks running north and south whid1 
were the subject of defendant's contract with the 
United States Government. 
The roadway on which plaintiff was traveling 
at the time of the accident is substantially higher 
immediately east of the ralroad tracks than where 
the road crosses the tracks, and the roadway decline~ 
sharply down to the level of the railroad tracks when 
one is traveling on it in a westerly direction ( T. Si-
88, 90-91, 97 and profile appearing on Exh. 30). 
Also, there is a slight down grade between the east 
set of tracks and the west set of tracks, the west 
set being approximately 9Yz inches lower than the 
east set (Tr. 94) . The distance between the two 
2 
-.;d:-; of tracks is approximately 8 feet 1 O inches 
( Exh. :30). 
The speed limit on the rnaclway m·er which 
pl:1intiff ,~:as traveling at the time of the accident 
'\;1s 21) mph (T. 99). 
ln crnssing over the two sets of rairoad tracks 
the cross-member of the frame of plaintiff's automo-
nile struck the surface of the roadway approximately 
;11idwa~· between the two sets of railrnad tracks (T. 
~r:>-~H) & Exh. 24:) and then struck the west most run-
rn ng rai 1 of the west set of tracks ( T. 77) and dis-
J,1dgecl two 39-foot lengths of rail (T. 78-79). The 
p(1int uf impact was near the point where the two 39-
f\iot rails had been joined together with a joint bar 
( Exh. 29). After the impact, plaintiff drove her 
,1momobile over the rail which she had just struck 
·,·.-ithont striking it again (T. 23), although the im-
pact had raised the rail higher than it was at the 
time of impact (T. 71-72 & Exhs. 1 & 29). 
The work which defendant company was doing 
under its contract with the United States Govern-
ment consisted of replacing the existing 66 pound 
rnnning rails (those on which the trains operate) 
\vi th 90 pound rails, including the necessary tieplates, 
joint bars, bolts, etc., and removing the crossing rails 
(those between the running rails) and refilling the 
area bet\veen the running rails with concrete. How-
P\·er, clef endant company was not to remove or alter 
3 
the ties or make any changes in the railroact tr«c:i 
road-bed (Tr. 66-67). c, , 
On the date of the accident in question, the dt·· 
fendant had completed installation of the ne\\ (11 , 
pound running rails at the intersection where tlii 
accident occurred, but the crossing rails had not \'tt 
been removed and replaced with conc1·ete. The ~h1 
running rails had been fully seated and spiked in 
place ( T. 69 & 86). The new running rails st0,,I! 
approximately 1 IA inches higher than the crossing 
rails between them (T. 68). The impact of plain-
tiff's automobile against the east side of the west 
running rail lifted the said rail and allowed fill 
gravel to fall in under the rail, thereby raising it 
out of its normal position (T. 71-72 & Exh. 29). 
This gravel had to be removed before the rail could 
be reset after the accident ( T. 79). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-
FUSING TO FIND DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Defendant contends that there is no evidence 
in the record which would sustain a finding that 
the defendant was guilty of negligence, a fortiori, 
that the defendant was guilty of negligence as a 
matter of law. The essence of plaintiff's alleged 
cause of action is that the defendant, "negligently 
and carelessly . . . raised a certain railroad track 
4 
:wpro:\imately three inches aboYe its nonnal posi-
[ion." (R.l pa1·. 3). The sole issue of alleged negli-
:..:•·ncc on the part of the defendant which was to 
lw cktermined at the time of trial was set forth in 
paragraph :3 of the Pre-trial Orde1· as follows: 
''Plaintiff alleges that defendant \Vas negli-
gt>nt in that defendant left a track that \Vas 
being installed, raised to such a height, that 
it constituted a hazard" (R. 7) . 
. \!though plaintiff represents in her brief in 
fr:e S~atement of Facts that there is evidence to the 
,_,-ffect that before the accident in question occurred, 
(idemlant had left one of the rails projecting three 
ti 1 four inches above the other rail, no citation to 
the record was made for this representation and, 
1n fact, there was no evidence produced at the trial 
~u support this allegation. The plaintiff admitted 
under cross examination that the photographs 
( Exhs. 1 & 2) which were introduced by her counsel 
during her direct examination tending to show an 
extended height of the west running rail were, in 
fact, taken after the accident had occurred ( T. 14). 
Contrasted with such evidence, Mr. Frank Mor-
gan, superintendent of defendant company, testified 
that he had personally inspected the entire length 
of track in question after the new 90 pound running 
rails had been installed and determined that the 
rails had been fully seated and spiked and that this 
work had been completed prior to the accident ( T. 69 
& 86). Mr. Morgan explained that a 90 pound rail 
5 
sitting on an appropriate tie plate would ext , 
approximately 1 % inches higher on the ties than ~~c, 
66 pounds rails which had been replaced ( T. 68). 1 ~ 
order to install the larger running rails, it was nee'. 
essary to remove the nearest inside crossing i·ail 
which evacuated a space of seven or eight inche~ 
on the inboard side of each running rail. This area 
·was filled with gravel until such time as all of the 
crossing rails could be removed and the area between 
the two running rails filled with concrete. Mr. Mor. 
gan testified that he inspected the crossings daily 
to insure that there was sufficient gravel in the~ 
areas, as did one of the staff from the Depot Engi-
neer's Office (T. 70). No complaints had ever bePn 
registered with Mr. Morgan regarding defendant's 1 
maintenance of these areas during the construction 
period (T. 71). 
Certainly, it could not be said that the pro-
cedure of installing running rails which were 1114 
inches higher than the crossing rails adjacent to , 
them and the filling of the space between such rails ' 
with gravel until all of the crossing rails could be 
removed and replaced with concrete was negligence 
as a matter of law. 
To the contrary, the jury unanimously found in 
answering Propositions Nos. 1 and 2 of the special 
verdict that the defendant did not create an un-
reasonable hazard by leaving a rail projecting too 
high ( R. 12) . The height of the west running. r~il 
as shown in the photographs marked as Exh1b1ts 
6 
: and 2 is easily explained by the testimony of Mr. 
Morgan that the impact of plaintiff's automobile 
1m the east side of the west rail raised the rail up 
and tilted it to the west allowing some of the fill 
gra''el which had been placed along side the rail, as 
1iJentioned above, to fall in under the rail and lift 
it abo1·e the normal position it occupied on the ties 
hrfore the accident occurred (T. 71-72 & Exh. 29). 
This fact is substantiated by Mr. Morgan's testi-
wony that this gravel had to be removed from under 
the west running rail before it could be reset after 
the accident (T. 79). 
The jury did answer Proposition No. 3 of the 
::pecial verdict to the effect that defendant was negli-
i~ent in not warning the plaintiff by signs or other-
'>Vise uf the danger in crossing the railroad tracks. 
This finding, however, is meaningless with respect to 
che duty of the defendant since the jury found that 
the defendant did not create a hazard at the crossing 
with respect to the rails which it had installed. The 
crossing was a hazardous crossing because of the 
abrupt fall in the grade of the road immediately 
east of the two railroad tracks for a vehicle approach-
ing the crossing from the east. This grade can be 
seeen to some extent by the lay of the land as shown 
in Exhibit 2, which is a photograph looking north 
along the railroad tracks. The grade is also indi-
cated, although not to scale, in the profile drawn by 
the investigating officer in Exhibit No. 30, and is 
a fact which was recognized by everyone at the trial 
7 
of the case, including plaintiff's counsel as inclic t, 1 · h" · a er in is cross examination of Mr. Morgan ( T. 87). 
However, the ~r~de of the road was not altered 
by the defendant in its work upon the railroad track 
In fact, the defendant made no changes with respe s; 
to the roadbed of the railroad tracks, but mere~v 
replaced the existing 66 pound rails with 90 poun~1 
rails, without disturbing the ties on which they were 
laid ( T. 66-67). If the defendant, as the jury found, 
did not create a hazard in the installation of the 
new rails, then there was nothing of which it was 
obligated to warn the plaintiff, and the special ver-
dict should have been worded so that the jury would 
be required to answer Proposition No. 3, only if they 
answered Propositions Nos. 1 or 2 in the affirma-
tive. 
The mere fact that the railroad tracks being 
worked upon by defendant company crossed a road 
which contained a hazardous dip in the area of the 
railroad tracks did not create a special duty on the 
part of the defendant to warn motorists using the 
road since the dip was a condition which could 
readily be seen by those using the road and the con-
dition itself gave as much warning of the peril as 
would a sign referring to it. This general prin· 
ciple is acknowledged in 38 American Jurispm 
ence, Negligence, Section 91, which reads as follows: 
"DANGERS KNOvVN, PATENT, OR OB-
VIOUS TO INJURED PERSON. - There 
is no absolute duty of giving warning of any 
8 
particular peril; the necessity therefor de-
pends upon the age, intelligence and informa-
tion of those to ~h01~ the .warning might be 
due a~d. the obligation d~sappears entirely 
where it is shmvn that the mjured person did 
in fact fully appreciate the peril. So in re-
spect of such peril as may be said to be ~bvious 
to the injured jerson, there is no obligation 
to give any sort of warning. He may be held 
guilty of contributory negligence because of 
his failure to protect himself against obvious 
perils. Although a duty rests upon a muni-
cipality, where an obstruction is permitted 
to remain on a highway or street, to give 
notice to the traveling public of its presence, 
yet, no other notice is needed than a view of 
the obstruction itself, where it can be seen 
in ample time to avoid injury .... " 
There is no question but that the plaintiff was 
generally familiar with the area where the accident 
occurred since she had ridden over the road the 
preYious days as a passenger in Mrs. Cherry's auto-
mobile ( T. 19 & 30), and she admitted being able 
to see the railroad crossing and the down grade of . 
the road leading into it as she approached it on the 
day of the accident (T. 22-23). Therefore, tech-
nically speaking, even if the defendant had created 
the hazardous dip in the roadway in which the rail-
road tracks were situated, a:qy failure of the de-
fendant to warn this particular plaintiff of the con-
dition could not be a proximate cause of the accident 
since she knew of the condition before the accident 
and could see it as she approached the place where 
the accident occurred. 
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POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE JU~y S 
FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIB-
UTORILY NEGLIGENT. 
As mentioned, but not fully discussed undei 
the preceeding point, the real cause of the accidcn~ 
in question was the fact that the plaintiff failul 
to observe or appreciate the abrupt dip in the road-
\vay as she approached the railroad crossing and 
was traveling too fast as she drove into the dip anti 
across the railroad tracks. The sudden dip in the 
roadway caused the front suspension system of 
plaintiff's automobile to bounce up and down and 
the cross-member of the frame struck low center at 
least twice. Once when it struck the macadam sur-
f ace of the roadway between the two sets of tracks 
and the second time when it struck the west running 
rail of the west track. 
The investigating officer testified that he found 
a fresh scrape in the macadam surface of the road 
which measured 21112 inches long by 7112 inches wide 
(T. 95 & Exh. 30) approximately midway between 
the two sets of tracks; and upon examining plain-
tiff's automobile, he found macadam on the cross-
member of the frame ( T. 96) . 
Mr. Kenneth Shefeski, automotive expert from 
Independent Automobile Damage Appraisers, testi-
fied it was mechanically possible for the cross-mem-
ber on an automobile of the make and model of 
plaintiff's automobile to come into contact with the 
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surf ace of the road if sufficient pressure were ex-
erted upon the front suspension system (T. 108). 
However, the jury did not need to rely solely upon 
his examination and findings since the investigating 
officed had actually f oud macadam on the cross-
member of plaintiff's automobile which eliminated 
any doubt as to whether or not it struck the surface 
of the roadway before it struck the rail in question. 
The automobile had been driven for 61,441 miles 
before the accident, apparently without replacement 
of the original shock absorbers ( T. 21) and the 
front tires were almost bald ( Exh. 21 & 22), which 
decreased the normal distance between the under 
carriage of the automobile and the surface of the 
mad. Exhibit No. 23, a photograph of the front 
undercarriage of the automobile, shows only a few 
inches of clearance between the bottom of the cross-
member. and the ground. Considering these condi-
tions, it is not hard to understand how the excessive 
spted of plaintiff's automobile as it was driven into 
the dip of the roadway caused the front end to bounce 
and strike the surface of the road and then the 
railroad track in question. 
Regarding the speed of plaintiff's automobile, 
Mr. Kay Hanson, a mechanical engineer, testified 
that at the time of the accident he was employed 
in the Facilities Branch of Engineering Division 
at Tooele Army Depot and went to the scene of the 
accident and made a determination of the speed at 
which plaintiff's automobile had to have been travel-
11 
in~ at the tim: of impact in order to pull up the 
rail and the spikes to the extent that he found th a~fter the accident. The factors taken into conside::~ 
tion ?Y Mr. Hans?n in his calculations were detailed 
by him for the Jury (T. 101) and the jury very 
properly could have accepted his conclusion that 
plaintiff's automobile was traveling over 25 mph at 
the time of impact. The speed limit on this particu-
lar road was 20 mph at the time of the accident 
according to the investigating officer (T. 99); and 
defendant contends that the reasonable speed for 
driving into the sharp dip in the roadway and across 
the railroad tracks would be even less than the gen-
eral speed limit posted for that particular road. 
Although the plaintiff testified she was travel-
ing between 10 to 15 mph at the time of the acci-
dent, she admitted on cross examination that at the 
time of the accident she was under the impression 
that the speed limit was 35 mph (T. 22), and even 
at the time of trial she was of the opinion that the 
speed limit at the time of the accident was 30 mph. 
In the light of the evidence concerning how the 
accident occured and the mathematical calculations 
made by Mr. Hanson which showed a speed at im-
pact of approximately twice that which the plaintiff 
claimed to have been traveling, the jury could reason-
ably find, as they did in answering Proposition No. 
6, that "the plaintiff was contributorily negligent i~ 
that she was driving too fast for the general condi-
tion of the road" ( R. 12). 
12 
Also, Mrs. Cherry, who was riding as a passenger 
in plaintiff's automobile at the time of the accident, 
admitted on cross examination that the plaintiff 
drove over the railroad tracks considerably faster 
than she, Mrs. Cherry, had on the day preceeding the 
accident. When asked the question, "So, whatever 
the speed limit was that Mrs. Roberts was driving 
the next day it was considerably faster than you 
<lrove the day before," she responded, "Yes, but she 
kept realizing the condition of that railroad track." 
(T. 31). Mrs. Cherry contended that she was travel-
ing only two miles per hour when she crossed the 
railroad tracks the day preceeding the accident and 
that the plaintiff was traveling only 13 miles per 
hour faster when she crossed the tracks at the time 
of the accident. However, her prejudice in answer-
ing questions under cross examination is obvious 
from the record and was probably due to the fact 
that at the time of trial Mrs. Cherry's claim for 
damages against the defendant was still pending as 
evidenced by the testimony of her attorney who was 
called as a defense witness to establish this fact 
(T. 114-115). In any event the substance of her 
testimony was that the plaintiff was traveling con-
siderably faster when she crossed the tracks at the 
time of the accident than Mrs. Cherry was when she 
crossed them the day before. Therefore, the jury 
could reasonably have found that Mrs. Cherry's 
speed was reasonable under the circumstances and 
that the plaintiff's was not. 
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Regardless of all other testimony bearing on th 
question of plaintiff's speed, the uncontrovert ~ 1 
h · 1 f eu p ys1ca acts foun~ by the investigating officer at 
the scene of the accident show that plaintiff's auto-
mobile came into the dip at such a speed that th 
. 1 e 
vertica movement in the front end suspension 
1 
system caused the cross member of plaintiff's auto-
mobile to strike the surface of the roadway approxi-
mately 91h feet before it ever struck the rail in ques-
tion. (Calculated from testimony at T. 90 & Exh. 
30). Unless plaintiff was traveling too fast for the 
1 
existing conditions of the roadway (the dip), wh~, 1 
did her automobile come down with enough fom 
to strike the surf ace of the road 9Yz feet before she 
struck the rail? Certainly, this evidence standing 
alone would support the jury's finding under Propo-
sition No. 6 that the plaintiff was traveling too fast 
for the general condition of the road in the area 
where the accident occurred. 
With respect to the evidence supporting de-
fendant's allegation and the jury's finding under 
Proposition No. 5 that plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent in that she failed to keep a proper lookout, 
the plaintiff testified that there were no objects 
blocking her view of the trackbed, which is in the 
dip area (T. 22), or of the down-grade leading to 
it (T. 23). Defendant submits that general exper-
ience justifies the inference that when one looks in 
the direction of an object clearly visible that he sees 
it and that when there is evidence to the effect that 
' 
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one did look but did not heed that which was in plain 
dew, it follows that either some part of the evidence 
is untrue, or that the person was negligently inatten-
tive. 
In this case, the plaintiff is on the horns of a 
dilemmea. If she did see the dip, she should have 
slowed down for it; if she did not see the dip, which 
was in plain view, then she was negligently inatten-
tive. She has to be negligent in one particular or the 
other since there is no question but that plaintiff's 
automobile traversed the dip area much too fast for 
the existing conditions of the roadway as evidenced 
by the fact that the cross-member of the automobile 
struck the surf ace of the road and made a gouge in 
it 21% inches long some 9¥2 feet before her auto-
mobile ever came in contact with the rail in question. 
Another fact to be noted is that after impact 
when the rail was actually higher than before im-
pact because of the fill gravel which had· gotten 
under it at the time of impact (T. 71 & 75), the 
plaintiff was able to drive her automobile over the 
rail without difficulty and stop west of the track 
bed ( T. 23). If the rail had been too high, per se, 
the cross-member would have again struck the rail, 
but it did not. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EN-
TERING JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT ON 
JURY VERDICT. 
After a jury has returned a verdict, either gen-
15 
eral or special, it is the trial court's duty to te . en r 
Judgement thereon so long as there is credible · 
d . h ev1. ence in t e record to support the verdict or f" d . In . 
ings, as the case may be, or unless error was con . 
mitted which had an adverse affect upon the tri~l 
to the extended that one can say that there is 
reasonable likelihood that the result would have bee: 
different in the absence of such error. Ri·vas u.,
1 
Pacific Finance Company, 16 Utah 2d 183, 397 P.2-d 
990 (1964), Brunson vs. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364 
412 P.2d 451 (1966), Hall vs. Blackham, 18 Utah 
2d 164, 417 P.2d 664 (1966). 
In determining whether or not there is suffi. 
cient evidence to support a verdict or a finding, the 
evidence, or any conflict in the evidence must be 
i·eviewed in the light most favorable to the jurv 
verdict or findings. Smith vs. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2cl 
344, 400 P.2d 570 ( 1965), Efco Distributing, Inc. 
vs. Parrin, 17 Utah 2d 375, 412 P. 2d 615 (1966), 
Schow vs. Guardtone, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 135, 417 
P.2d 643 (1966). 
The fact that the jury's answer to Proposition 
No. 3 is somewhat inconsistent with its answers to 
Propositions Nos. 1 and 2 as discussed above under 
Point I, does not give rise to a right for a new trial 
since even if the jury had found that the defendant 
was negligent in creating a hazard in their answerR 
to Propositions Nos. 1 or 2, the judgment on the 
special verdict would still be the same since t?e jury 
found that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
16 
nqrligence in two particulars in their answers to 
Propositions Nos. 5 and 6. Therefore, if there was 
any error in the wording of the special verdict sub-
rni tted by the court in allowing the jury to answer 
Proposition No. 3 without first answering Prposi-
tion Nos. 1 or 2 affirmatively, the error was harm-
less in that it did not affect the final judgment 
~·endered on the total special verdict. Certainly, the 
plaintiff was not prejudiced by the wording of Prop-
osition No. 3. If any prejudice occurred in the word-
ing of said proposition, it was in favor of the plain-
tiff and adverse to the defendant. However, there 
is no evidence or inference in the record that the 
'1\-ording of Proposition No. 3 affected the substan-
tial rights of either party to this action. 
Jf the substantial rights of the parties were 
not affected, minor errors of the trial court are not 
grounds for reversal or a new trial. In LeBouthillier 
vs. Shurtleff and Andrews, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 178, 
417 P.2d 756 (1966) the trial court gave one in-
struction which may have been erroneous, but which, 
in view of all of the other instructions and the evi-
dence, did not affect the substantial right of the 
parties. On appeal the verdict of the jury and judg-
ment entered thereon was affirmed and the prin-
ciple regarding substantial rights was stated as fol-
lows: 
"The court did give certain instructions to 
the jury defining correctly the principal of 
'proximate cause' and, although it might be 
17 
concluded the court erred in giving the in. 
struction quoted above, in view of the evidenc 
and all the instructions taken together, it i~ 
our opinion that the error did not adversek 
affect the substantial rights of the parties an~l 
is not prejudicial. Unless an error is prejudi-
cial a judgment will not be reversed by this 
court." 
The case of King vs. Vets Cab, Inc., 295 P.2d 
605 (Kan. 1956), cited by appellant, is distinguish-
able from the instant case since in the former, as 
stated by the Kansas Supreme Court, "the jury did 
not find by direct answer that the plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence." In the instant 
case, the jury found that the plaintiff was guilty of 
contributory negligence in two specific instances as 
answered directly in Propositions Nos. 5 and 6. 
The parties having been afforded a trial, 2, 
presumption arises that the judgment is correct and 
proper and should not be disturbed unless the one 
attacking it meets the burden of showing substantial 
and prejudicial error. In Robinson vs. Hreinson, 17 
Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 121 ( 1965) at page 267, this 
principle was stated as follows: 
"The parties have had what they were en· 
titled to: a full and fair opportunity to pre· 
sent their contentions and evidence support· 
18 
ing them to the court and jury. When this 
has been done all presumptions are in favor of 
the validity of the verdict and judgment." 
CONCLUSION 
The jury specifically found in answering Propo-
::-:ition Nos. 1 and 2 that the defendant was not 
negligent in the particulars alleged in plaintiff's 
complaint and delineated as issues for trial, i.e., 
installing a railroad track at a height which con-
stituted a hazard. Therefore, the finding of the jury 
in Proposition No. 3, that the defendant was negli-
gent in failing to warn is meaningless and super-
fluous with respect to the defendant since the de-
fendant created no hazard. Any hazard existing 
at the railroad crossing was due to the abrupt dip 
in the grade of the road, which was not constructed 
by the defendant and over which the defendant had 
no control, and consequently no duty. 
The jury found that the plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence in ( 1) failing to keep 
a reasonable lookout for road conditions and (2) 
traveling too fast for conditions of the road. There 
was credible evidence introduced at the trial which 
would support the jury's findings on those proposi-
tions; and the jury having so found, such evidence 
must now be viewed in the light most favorable to 
the jury verdict. The appellant has cited no sub-
stantial or prejudicial error in the record which 
would create a reasonable inference that the verdict 
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would have been different in its absence. Therefort' 
' the substantial rights of the parties were not affecter! ' 
and respondent respectfully submits that the judg-
ment of the trial court as entered on the jury verdict 
should be affirmed with costs to respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN 
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH. 
909 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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